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Abstract: Vehicular Ad-hoc NETwork (VANET) is a special mobile ad hoc network that composed of
facilities such as vehicle nodes and roadside units. Message transfer among vehicle nodes has been a
great challenge due to the network’s highly variable topology and the selfish nature of vehicle nodes.
Thus, it is very necessary to propose a mechanism to improve the cooperation among vehicle nodes
to guarantee the effective message transmission. Currently, incentive-based cooperation mechanisms
are commonly used to encourage nodes to participate in message transmission. Those mechanisms
are based on traditional economics and generally assume that the decision-making behavior of nodes
is completely independent. Also, the cooperation of nodes depends on whether the cooperation
behavior can obtain the higher utility. But researches in behavioral economics have shown that due
to the existence of altruistic reciprocity, the behavior of nodes is affected by not only their utility
but also the behavioral motives of other nodes, so as to obtain different results from traditional
incentive-based mechanisms. Therefore, the paper introduces the reciprocal altruistic from behavioral
economics and proposes the reciprocal altruistic factor to reconstruct the utility function of nodes.
The reconstructed utility function reflects the interaction of behavioral motives among nodes,
which promotes the node’s cooperative behavior. Also, since the Network Formation Game (NFG)
is a common mathematical model for studying the interaction and communication links formation
among network nodes, hence the paper regards NFG in traditional economics as the research object.
A Behavior Economics-based Message Transmission Cooperation Guarantee Mechanism named
BMCGM is proposed, which motivates nodes to participate in the message transmission to reduce the
transmission delay ratio. The simulation results show that the BMCGM reduces message transmission
delay by at least 30.3% compared with the recent representative cooperation transmission mechanism.
Keywords: VANETs; behavior economics; reciprocal altruistic; network formation game;
cooperative communication
1. Introduction
VANET is a special mobile ad hoc network (MANET) that has special characteristics compared
with mobile ad hoc networks such as highly dynamic topologies, frequently disconnected links,
restricted moving directions (which effected by the direction of the road, traffic lights, etc.) and without
restrictions for energy and storage [1,2]. Vehicles in VANET can communicate with other vehicles via
the On-Board Unit (OBU) and can also communicate with the RoadSide Unit (RSU) via the OBU [3].
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While VANET provides convenient services [4–9], the nodes need to participate in the message
transmission actively. However, when nodes participate in cooperation, they will cost their own
communication resources. At the same time, there are some security or privacy issues such as leakage
of location information. Above factors may reduce the willingness of nodes to cooperate. Thus, how to
effectively promote node’s participation in message transmission is one of the research hotspots of
current vehicle networks.
Current cooperation mechanisms in VANET can be divided into five aspects: the incentive-based,
the punishment-based, the retrieval-based, the misbehavior detection-based and the mobile social
networking-based cooperation mechanism. Among them, the incentive-based and the retrieval-based
are widely studied.
Some current incentive-based cooperation mechanisms [10–14] are generally based on traditional
economics. Most of them assume that nodes are rational and the behavior of nodes is not related to
other nodes’ decisions. The utility of nodes depends on some aspects such as the success rate and the
consumption of message transmission. On the other hand, in order to maximize own utility, nodes
always choose to cooperate under this condition. However, some researches in behavioral economics
show that [15], because of the existence of altruistic reciprocity, the behavioral decision of nodes
considers not only the economic utility but also the behavior of other nodes. The actual perceived
utility affects the behavioral choice of the node.
The NFG is a common mathematical model for studying the interaction and communication links
formation among network nodes, thus the paper regards NFG in traditional economics as the research
object. We construct a cooperative willingness function based on reciprocal altruistic. It can reflect
whether other nodes are friendly or unfriendly. Then we design a reciprocal utility function based on
cooperative willingness function. The utility of a node is determined by the combination of economical
utility and reciprocal utility. We analyze the nodes’ behavior based on reciprocal altruistic and propose
BMCGM to promote cooperation behavior. Our contributions are listed as follows:
1. A reciprocal altruistic factor is proposed to build the actual perceived utility of the nodes,
which overturns the existing definition of the utility function and increases the cooperation rate
of nodes by reconstructing the utility function;
2. We take NFG in traditional economics as the research object and analyze the decision-making
behavior of nodes while considering the reciprocal altruistic of nodes. A new message
transmission cooperation mechanism named BMCGM is proposed to reduce the message
transmission delay.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related works. Section 3
presents the system model; the system model is the basis of BMCGM proposed in this paper. Section 4
provides a detailed description on the BMCGM. Section 5 compares BMCGM with the existing
cooperation mechanism through simulation experiments. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Related Work
In this section, we briefly review related works on cooperation guarantee mechanisms and
reciprocal altruistic.
2.1. Cooperation Guarantee Mechanisms
According to Reference [16], the current message cooperation guarantee mechanism in VANETs
can be divided into five aspects.
Punishment-based cooperative guarantee mechanism punishes nodes that make malicious or
selfish behavior in the network. Jesudoss et al. [17] proposed a punishment-based cooperation
guarantee mechanism, which gives corresponding punishment to the nodes that refused to cooperate
in the cluster.
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The cooperation guarantee mechanism based on malicious behavior detection detects nodes with
selfish and malicious behavior and expels them from the network. An anonymous credential system
was proposed in Reference [18] to detect and limit the frequent replacement of credentials by malicious
nodes and to revoke the credentials of malicious nodes.
When it comes to the cooperation guarantee mechanism in mobile social networks, the social
relationships that exist among the nodes are explored and used to promote the participation of the
nodes. In Reference [19], a Vehicular Social Network Protocol (VSNP) was proposed to promote
cooperation among nodes.
The current mainstream cooperation guarantee mechanisms are the incentive-based and the
reputation-based, which are described in detail as follows.
A. Incentive-based cooperation transmission mechanisms
The incentive-based cooperation transmission mechanism provides incentives or rewards to
the nodes to promote cooperation among nodes. In order to promote the message transmission
among nodes in VANETs, researchers proposed some message transmission cooperation guarantee
mechanisms based on utility maximization. In Reference [11], the authors proposed a service-based
Cooperation Message transmission model (COMES). In COMES, the node decides whether to stay in
the coalition or to leave the alliance according to the obtained incentives, which are determined by
factors such as the average message receiving rate of the coalition. A secure cooperative download
incentive mechanism (SIRC) was proposed in Reference [12]. While ensuring secure transmission, SIRC
minimizes the payment risk of the destination node. The nodes participating in the message forwarding
can only obtain all the rewards after being confirmed by the destination node. Xu et al. [13] proposed
an incentive-based advertising message transmission mechanism. It provides the same reward for
all nodes which involved in the transmission and does not consider the different transmission costs
generated by each node. A coalition formation game-based cooperation mechanism was proposed
in Reference [14], which discusses the rewards of the source node and the relay node. The value of
the rewards is determined by parameters such as the number of participating cooperation messages
and the time of carrying the message. Jesudoss et al. [17] proposed a cooperation mechanism with
rewards and punishments. In this mechanism, trusted nodes receive rewards in the cluster, which is
related to the consumption of participation. A Rewards and Bounds-based cooperation transmission
mechanism named RBI was proposed in Reference [20], which constructs a forwarding tree from the
source node to the destination node. RBI provides rewards to nodes which participate in message
transmission based on their effort degree. Additional bonus is provided to the last two nodes which
are finally involved in forwarding. The rewards received by the nodes are determined by factors
such as the number of transmission messages and Time To Live (TTL). In Reference [21], the authors
proposed an incentive-based collaborative content download mechanism, the incentives obtained by
the nodes are determined by the combination of rewards and consumption to transmit the content.
In Reference [22], the authors studied a network coding-based message forwarding mechanism and
constructed an incentive matrix to motivate relay nodes to forward message. The node’s incentive
value depends on the consumption of encoding and forwarding messages. NFG-based Cooperation
Transmission Mechanism Algorithm (NGOMA), was proposed in Reference [23]. The mechanism is
based on the NFG [24], which refers to a network game involving a certain number of independent
decision makers (participants). The decision makers independently make decisions and interact to
form a suitable connected graph to connect them. And the goals and the benefits that the decision
makers received in the graph will affect the resulting network directed graph. NGOMA improves
the message transmission mechanism. When the link from the source node to the destination node
fails, the surrounding neighbor nodes calculate an incentive function and retransmit the message to
the destination node according to the incentive value. Since NGOMA is currently a representative
cooperation guarantee mechanism in VANET, we use NGOMA for comparison in order to evaluate
the BMCGM.
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B. Reputation-based cooperation transmission mechanisms
In the reputation-based cooperation transmission mechanism, nodes which have contributed
to their network and have good reputation can use network resources, while those with poor
reputation will be evicted from the network. Hu et al. [25] proposed PTRS, which uses the Dirichlet
distribution to calculate the feedback reputation to determine the credibility of the node. The authors in
Reference [26] proposed a reputation-based mechanism, where a reputation system is designed for the
platform nodes to collect feedback from surrounding nodes and determine the reputation of the nodes.
A message reliability-based reputation mechanism was proposed in Reference [27]. The reliability of
the message is related to the reputation value of nodes which transmitted this message. Li et al. [28]
proposed a reputation mechanism which measures the reliability of the message by collecting feedback
reputation. A local and recommended-based reputation mechanism was proposed in Reference [29],
which introduces Dempster-Shafer Theory to update local reputation.
In punishment-based and misbehavior detection-based cooperative guarantee mechanisms,
such as [17,18], the malicious node needs to be detected precisely. Therefore, the core nodes need to
collect the communication information of surrounding nodes. They should have high storage capacity
and high processing capability, which makes these mechanisms unsuitable for the general situation.
The above-mentioned incentive-based and reputation-based mechanisms are mostly based on the
expected utility theory of traditional economics, such as mechanisms proposed in Reference [11–14,20–23].
Those mechanisms assumed that nodes are independent of each other and each decision behavior of a
node depends on the utility value itself and does not affected by the decision motivation of other nodes.
The reputation-based cooperation transmission mechanisms proposed in Reference [25–29] assumes
that nodes tend to cooperate with the nodes which have high reputation values. The value of reputation
becomes the sole motivation for node’s behavior decision and does not consider the behavioral motives
of other nodes. In recent years, more and more research results in behavioral economics [30–32]
showed that the decision-making motivations of other nodes have an intrinsic influence on them
due to the reciprocal altruistic. The incentive function based on the maximization of economic utility
ignores the influence of this internal factor, thus the effectiveness of cooperation promoting of these
mechanisms is under determined. Therefore, this paper uses the reciprocal altruistic from behavioral
economics to design the utility function of nodes and analyzes the influence of reciprocal altruistic on
the behavior decision and utility of nodes and hence obtains a new message cooperation transmission
mechanism named BMCGM.
2.2. Reciprocal Altruistic
Reciprocal altruistic is a kind of help to others at the expense of their own interests. While giving
help, they also look forward to the help of others in the future. They give rewards to the motives of
good intentions and punish malicious motives.
In the field of economics, researchers mainly study reciprocal altruistic in terms of economics
behavior and game and assume that participants in the game will reward goodwill behavior and
punish malicious behavior. Stanca and Falk et al. [33,34] considered the individual’s behavioral motives
and believed that the individual’s behavior not only judges the behavioral outcome but also judges the
behavioral intentions and motivations of other individuals, thus affects the final individual behavioral
decision. These studies also fully demonstrate that a single consideration of the impact of material gain
on the node is not sufficient. The authors in Reference [35] pointed out that reciprocity can effectively
encourage individuals to cooperate. Barta et al. [36] indicated that reciprocal altruistic can promote
cooperation and nodes continue to help others after receiving help from others, which also occurs
among large groups. An evolutionary game model among reciprocal participants and opportunistic
participants was established in Reference [37]. It proves that reciprocal altruistic is the only evolutionary
stability strategy when participants can observe the type of each other, regardless of whether the
reciprocal participants can supervise the speculative behavior. A sequential reciprocal game model was
proposed in Reference [38]. The model defines the cooperative willing function, analyzes whether the
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other party is a good faith behavior or a malicious behavior, determines the willingness to cooperate of
nodes according to the goodwill of the other party and defines the utility function of the reciprocator.
The utility function is divided into two parts: economic utility and reciprocal utility.
In the field of experimental economics, the existence of reciprocal altruistic was proved by
experiments in Reference [39]. The participants who generate the game cooperative behavior are not
rewarded by the reciprocator. The authors in Reference [40] studied a gift exchange game experiment.
Some participants are found to have reciprocal behavior which can affect the final game outcome.
In the field of biology, the non-relative mutual help behavior among biological individuals was
described by the prisoner’s dilemma game model in Reference [41], which is defined as reciprocal
altruistic behavior. Based on the evolutionary strategy of prisoner game evolution, a mathematical
model of altruistic reciprocal evolution was established in Reference [42] to explain the generation of
reciprocal altruistic behaviors in biological nature.
It can be seen from the above that there are some researches on the reciprocal altruistic in many
fields and the reciprocal altruistic affects individual behaviors. The authors introduced behavior
economic to social networking and crowd sourcing in Reference [43,44] and achieved good results.
But according to the author’s research, there is currently no literature on the use of reciprocal altruistic
for VANET. Therefore, based on the reciprocal altruistic of behavioral economics, this paper proposes a
new message transmission cooperation guarantee mechanism based on the behavioral economics [45].
The detailed description of the mechanism is given as follows.
3. System Modeling
The system model proposed in this paper is inspired by a biological experiment. In the field of
biology, reciprocal altruistic was first observed in an experiment on vampire bats feeding back similar
species [46]. In this paper, the experiment is mapped to the cooperation mechanism in VANETs and
the reciprocal altruistic behavior of the node is explored. A new message transmission cooperation
guarantee mechanism different from the traditional one is proposed.
3.1. The Introduction of Reciprocal Altruistic
Back-feeding behavior among vampire bats is often regarded as an example of reciprocal
altruistic [47,48]. This paper uses an experiment on vampire bats [48] to illustrate the problem.
Some experimental observations are listed as follows:
(A) In a group of eight bats, five bats are removed from the group before feeding and returned to the
group at dawn. It is subsequently observed that the five bats which are not fed received feedback
from the group;
(B) In another bat group, one bat is removed from the group every night before feeding and each bat
is removed from the group at least twice. It is found that the bats which are fed back are more
inclined to feed back to other bats in later experiments. And a male bat in the group who does
not make a back-feeding behavior and is weakly connected to other bats did not receive feedback
from other bats even if it needs to be feedback.
If the vampire bats in this experiment are completely rational, then they will not help other
bats in the event, which may reduce their own survival opportunity (the bats that are fed are
theoretically more likely to survive than the starving bats) and should not punish the bats that
exhibit “malicious” behavior.
Based on this experiment, the paper proposes BMCGM. The mapping relationship is shown
in Table 1.
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Table 1. The mapping of vampire bat experiment and incentive mechanism.
Participants Events Decisions
Vampire bat
experiment (A) Vampire bat Some bats are fasted
Bats getting food feedback to
fasted bats
Vampire bat
experiment (B) Vampire bat
Bats are fasted in rotation,
including bats without
back-feeding behavior
Bats that are not fasted are fed






Nodes request help for
forwarding messages from
surrounding node
The surrounding nodes choose to
cooperate based on a utility value




Nodes request help for
forwarding messages from
surrounding node
Due to the reciprocal altruistic of
the node, there is a reciprocal
utility caused by reciprocal
cooperation which makes
U′ = U′p + Uc > U, the node will
choose to cooperate
Commonality Ability to judgegains and losses
There are participants who
need help/cooperation
Whether other participants make
decisions to help/cooperate
U and U′ indicate the total utility of the node, Up and U′p indicate the economic utility of the node. Uc indicates the
reciprocal utility of the node.
3.2. System Model
As shown in Figure 1, our network model mainly includes vehicle nodes and RSU. The vehicle
node can communicate directly with the RSU in the range (Vehicle to RoadSide Unit communication,
V2R communication) and the vehicle node can also communicate with the vehicle node within the
communication distance by the vehicle unit (Vehicle to Vehicle communication, V2V communication),
or can communicate with other vehicle nodes which outside its communication range through other
vehicle nodes. When the vehicle node communicates through one or more hops, a tree communication
structure from the source node to the destination node is established and the vehicle node can perform
message transmission along the established tree structure.
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Figure 1. Network model. 
In our model, the RSUs store some information about the nodes’ interaction and an interaction 
message { , , , , , , }InterMsg MsgNo NID SID DID Time IsCoop PK=  is sent to the RSU whenever 
the node pair completes an interaction, where MsgNo is the serial number of the message, NID  
indicates the unique ID of the node that submit the message, SID  indicates the unique ID of the 
message sending node, DID  indicates the unique ID of the message receiving node,Time indicates 
i . t l.
In our odel, the RSUs store so e infor ation about the nodes’ interaction and an interaction
message InterMsg = {MsgNo, NID, SID, DID, Time, IsCoop, PK} is sent to the RSU whenever the
node pair completes an interaction, where MsgNo is the serial number of the message, NID indicates
the unique ID of the node that submit the message, SID indicates the unique ID of the message sending
node, DID indicates the unique ID of the message receiving node,Time indicates the time that t e
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interaction occurred and IsCoop indicates whether the receiving node cooperates in the interaction and
PK denotes the private key of the node that submits the message to RSU, PK can be used to verify the
correctness of the message. This interaction information is submitted in order to obtain the necessary
information from the RSU when nodes are trying to form a communication link with other nodes
later. To simplify the model, we assume that the node will honestly submit the interaction information.
In order to clearly explain the contents of this section, the main parameters used in this section are
shown in Table 2.




A, Ai Node, node i
Γ, Γi Economic utility, node i′s economic utility
Π, Πij The cooperative willingness, The cooperative willingness that node i to node j
δ, δi The level of reciprocal altruistic, The level of node i′s reciprocal altruistic
Φ, Φi Reciprocal utility, node i′s reciprocal utility
γ Reciprocal altruistic cooperation influence coefficient
µ Cost coefficient
C, Ci Cost, node i′s cost
Λ, Λi Utility, node i′s utility
s, sc, sci , sij
Strategy, node’s current strategy, node i′s current strategy, strategy that node i choose to
cooperate with node j
Gsci ,−sci The network topology while node i and other nodes remain their current strategy
Gsci ,−sci + sij The network topology while node i choose sij and other nodes remain their current strategy
In this paper, BMCGM is divided into two phases: the cooperation formation phase and the
multi-hop relay phase. The focus is to study how to promote the cooperative behavior of nodes under
the altruistic reciprocity, so that the node can participate in multi-hop message transmission by the
formed network graph. Thus, the phase of cooperation formation is the focus of this paper. Each phase
is described as follows in conjunction with the Figure 1.
Cooperation formation phase: as shown in Figure 1, we assume that node A needs to send a
message to node E. Since node E is not in the communication range of node A, it is necessary to
construct a multi-hop communication link from node A to node E. In the communication range of
node A, there are node B and node E. Node A acquires ΠBA of node B and ΠEA of node E through
the adjacent RSU and simultaneously calculates the ΓA that may be obtained, then calculates ΛA
that may be obtained by cooperation with node B and node E respectively according to ΓA, ΠBA
and ΠEA. At last, node A determines which node to cooperate based on ΛA. In Figure 1, node A
finally selects node B as its next hop. Node B repeats this phase until destination node E is within its
communication range.
Multi-hop relay phase: as shown in Figure 1, after the completion of the cooperation formation
phase, the communication link from node A to node E is A→ B→ C → D → E , that is, node A sends
a message to node E along the link.
4. The Details of BMCGM
This section is the core of the paper, including the node utility function design based on reciprocal
altruistic, the analysis of the influence of the reciprocal altruistic of the node on its behavior and the
design of NFG algorithm based on reciprocal altruistic. To clearly explain the contents of this section,
the main parameters used are shown in Table 2.
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4.1. Reciprocal Altruistic-Based Utility function
The main purpose of this section is to design a utility function that promotes node cooperation.
For any vehicle node A in the network G(A, ε) and ε denotes the communication links among
nodes. When it successfully participates in the cooperative transmission of the message, it will
get a positive incentive value. When designing the utility function, traditional message cooperation
mechanisms usually only consider the transmission effort of nodes and design economics utility
functions accordingly. Because of the existence of reciprocal altruistic, this paper considers the
transmission cost of nodes and the cooperation effort of nodes. Based on this, a utility function
including economic utility and reciprocal utility is designed.
4.1.1. Nodes’ Transmission Effort
To evaluate the transmission cost of the node, that is, the economic utility, we need to analyze
the nodes in the message transmission link. It is assumed that the economic utility of each node





where ξi is the number of messages which node Ai participates in the cooperative transfer, τi is the
average transmission energy loss of the message of node Ai, ϕi is the average message carrying time
of node Ai. When a node consumes the more energy in order to participate in message transmission,
the more effort it exerts. When the node carries the message for a long time without forwarding the
message, the possibility that the message is transmitted to the destination node before the end of
the TTL will decrease. So, the longer the average message carrying time of the node is, the less the
transmission effort is paid.
4.1.2. Nodes’ Reciprocal Cooperation
Reciprocal utility refers to the psychological utility of nodes due to reciprocal cooperation. In order
to analyze the reciprocal utility of nodes for mutual cooperation, we first define the cooperative
















and ΩDij respectively indicate the node cooperation and non-cooperation times interacting
with the other nodes. It can be seen from Equation (2) that Π of the node depends on the cooperation
and non-cooperation times of the node. The denominator part is added 1 to prevent Π value becomes
0 or 1 when the nodes have only one interaction. When there is no interaction between node pair,
the default value is 12 .
At the same time, since the node has reciprocal altruistic properties, the following equation
is established:
Πij = δi ·Πji (3)
where δ, Π ∈ [0, 1], δi is reciprocal altruistic factor, means the level of reciprocal altruistic of node Ai,
when δi is larger, Π given to other nodes by node Ai will increase accordingly. On the other hand,
the smaller the δi is, the less Π of node Ai will be reduced, that is, the node with higher degree of
reciprocity, Π of Ai given to other nodes is also higher.
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According to Π of the node and the reciprocal altruistic, the reciprocal utility function of the node
Ai is given by:
Φi = ∑
Aj∈G,j 6=i
Πji + γ · Γi · ∑
Aj∈G,j 6=i
Πji (4)
It can be seen from Equation (4) that the node’s psychological utility function is related to Π of
other nodes in addition to its own Γi, which is because of nodes with reciprocal altruistic attributes,
Π of other nodes will increase its degree of willingness to cooperate, the greater Π of other nodes
is, the higher the willingness to cooperate is and the greater Φi is. Where γ is reciprocal altruistic
cooperation influence coefficient, indicates the potential impact of reciprocal cooperation among nodes
on their Φi. It is because in order to complete the successful transmission of the message, it is often
necessary to cooperate with each node on the link. The strategy S selected by each node may be related
to the behavior of other nodes, which will have some potential impacts and γ ∈ [0, 1), γ = 0 means
the Φi of nodes is only related to Π of other nodes.
4.1.3. Utility Function
Based on Γi and Φi of the node, we define the utility function of the node as follows:
Λi = α · ξi ·τiϕi + β · ∑Aj∈G,j 6=i
Πji
+ β · γ · ξiτiϕi · ∑Aj∈G,j 6=i
Πji − Ci
(5)
where α and β represent the node’s economic utility proportion coefficient and the reciprocal utility
proportion coefficient in the total utility of the node, and:
α + β = 1 (6)




µ · ((Γi)2 + Πi2) (7)
When α = 1, β = 0, it indicates that the node is a node that is assumed by traditional economics
to maximize its own Φi and in the cost Ci, Πi = 0. This is because the nodes assumed in traditional
economics do not have reciprocal cooperative behavior.µ indicates the cost coefficient, when µ gets
larger, the cost of cooperation among nodes is larger.
According to the Equation (5), the cost of node Ai is related to its Φi and cooperative efforts
brought about by reciprocal cooperation.
We use Figure 2 to illustrate the effect of Φ on the node’s behavior. Suppose node S needs to send
a message to node D:
When α = 1, β = 0, c = 0.2, nodes are assumed in traditional economics to maximize Λ.
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For node S:
If S chooses to cooperate with node I, the possible utility of node S is:
ΛS−I = 1× 5 + 0× 2− 0.5× 0.2× 52 = 2.5;
If S chooses to cooperate with node H, the possible utility of node S is:
ΛS−H = 1× 4 + 0× 4− 0.5× 0.2× 42 = 2.4;
Since ΛS−I > ΛS−H , node S may choose to cooperate with node I.
Assuming node I cooperates, then for node I:
If I chooses to cooperate with node J, the possible utility of node I is:
ΛI−J = 1× 3 + 0× 1− 0.5× 0.2× 32 = 2.1;
If I chooses to cooperate with node K, the possible utility of node I is:
ΛI−K 1× 2 + 0× 2− 0.5× 0.2× 22 = 1.6;
Since ΛI−J > ΛI−K, node I may choose to cooperate with node J.
Assuming node J cooperates, then for node J:
If J chooses to cooperate with node M, the possible utility of node J is:
ΛJ−M = 1× 4 + 0× 1− 0.5× 0.2× 42 = 2.4;
If J chooses to cooperate with node L, the possible utility of J is:
ΛJ−L = 1× 3 + 0× 3− 0.5× 0.2× 32 = 2.1;
Since ΛJ−M > ΛJ−L, node J may choose to cooperate with node M.
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Since node D is located at the transmission range of node M, node M no longer performs
cooperative node selection and transmits the message directly to node D. The resulting communication
link at this point may be: S→ I → J → M→ D
When α = β = 0.5, c = 0.2, the nodes are with reciprocal altruistic.
For node S:
If S chooses to cooperate with node I, the possible utility of node S is:
ΛS−I = 0.5× 5 + 0.5× 2− 0.1× (52 + 22) = 0.6;
If S chooses to cooperate with node H, the possible utility of node S is:
ΛS−H = 0.5× 4 + 0.5× 4− 0.1× (42 + 42) = 0.8
Since ΛS−I < ΛS−H , node S may choose to cooperate with node H.
Assuming node H cooperates, then for node H:
If H chooses to cooperate with node J, the possible utility of node H is:
ΛH−J = 0.5× 3 + 0.5× 1− 0.1× (32 + 12) = 1;
If H chooses to cooperate with node K, the possible utility of node H is:
ΛH−K = 0.5× 2 + 0.5× 2− 0.1× (22 + 22) = 1.2;
Since ΛH−J < ΛH−K, node H may choose to cooperate with node K.
Assuming node K cooperates, then for node K:
If K chooses to cooperate with node M, the possible utility of node K is:
ΛK−M = 0.5× 4 + 0.5× 1− 0.1× (42 + 12) = 0.8;
If K chooses to cooperate with node L, the possible utility of node K is:
ΛK−L = 0.5× 3 + 0.5× 3− 0.1× (32 + 32) = 1.2;
Since ΛK−M < ΛK−L, node K may choose to cooperate with node L.
Since node D is located at the transmission range of node L, node L no longer performs cooperative
node selection and transmits the message directly to node D. The resulting communication link at this
point may be: S→ H → K → L→ D ;
4.2. Reciprocal Altruistic-Based NFG Algorithm
The main purpose of this section is to design NFG algorithm, which simulates node interactions
considering reciprocal altruistic of nodes.
Since the vehicle nodes in the network are determined independently of each other, they can
decide whether to use a node as their next hop, that is, whether to establish a communication link with
a certain node. We first define the strategy set of the vehicle node Ai, denoted by ∆i = {s1, s2, . . . sn}.
The set ∆i contains all the strategy possibilities of node Ai in the current network environment and
node Ai can select a strategy s from the set ∆i to change the currently executed strategy. Assume that
the strategy currently used by node Ai is si ∈ ∆i, the network topology at this time is represented as
Gsci ,−sci , where −si indicates strategy that other nodes are taken at this time. When node Ai selects a
new strategy sj ∈ ∆i and other nodes keep the current strategy unchanged, the new network strategy
can be represented as Gnew = Gsci ,−sci + sij.
When node Ai selects strategy sj = (Ai, Aj) ∈ ∆i, that is, node Ai attempts to establish a link
with node Aj. In the traditional economics persecution, if node Aj agrees to establish a link with node
Ai, its utility will be reduced, node Aj may refuse to establish link with node Ai. However, under
the concept of behavioral economics, because of the existence of the reciprocal altruistic, even if it
may reduce the utility of node Aj, node Aj will still choose to cooperate. We define the reciprocal
cooperation strategy as follows:
Definition 1. Reciprocal cooperation strategy sij. When strategy sij = (Ai, Aj) ∈ ∆i makes Γi(Gsci ,−sci + sij) <
Γi(Gsci ,−sci ) and because of Φi which makes the total utility Λi(Gsci ,−sci + sij) ≥ ΛAj(Gsci ,−sci ), the strategy sij
is a reciprocal cooperation strategy, the set of the strategy sij is represented by the set ∆i
∗ and ∆i
∗ ⊆ ∆i.
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The reciprocal cooperation strategy sij causes node Ai to request the link with node Aj because
the strategy ultimately increases the utility of node Ai. Based on the reciprocal cooperation strategy,
we define the optimal reciprocal cooperation strategy set as follows:
Definition 2. Optimal reciprocal cooperation strategy s∗ij. When the reciprocal cooperation strategy s
∗
ij ⊆ ∆i∗
makes the utility value Λi(Gsci ,−sci + s
∗
ij) ≥ Λi(Gsci ,−sci ) of the node Ai, s
∗
ij ⊆ ∆i∗, the strategy s∗ij is an optimal
reciprocal cooperation strategy and the set of the strategy s∗ij is represented by the set ∆̂i
∗, ∆̂i∗ ⊆ ∆i∗.
4.2.1. The Influence of δ and β
In the process of NFG, due to the existence of δ of the node, the strategy selection of the node will
be affected by the reciprocal altruistic. When δ changes, the optimal reciprocal cooperation strategy set
∆̂i∗ ⊆ ∆i∗ of the node may also change accordingly. So that the final optimal reciprocal cooperation
strategy can make each vehicle node to a select the most suitable one (if the strategy is feasible)
according to the current network conditions and increase the utility of the node itself. Therefore,
our NFG algorithm is an algorithm based on the optimal reciprocal cooperation strategy ∆̂i∗ of nodes
and the optimal reciprocal cooperation strategy set ∆̂i∗ is related to δ. Next, we analyze the impact of δ
on node cooperative behavior and its utility.
A. The influence of δ on nodes’ cooperation behavior
Since the cooperative behavior of the node is related to Π of the node, in order to analyze the
influence of δ on the node’s cooperative behavior, we substitute Equations (3) and (4) into Equation (5).
We find partial derivatives for Γ and Π respectively and obtain possible extreme points Γi∗ and Πi∗,
which we will further analyze in later sections:
Γi∗ =
α · µ · δ2i + β2 · γ
δ2i · µ2 − β2 · γ2
(8)
Πi∗ =
β · δi · (µ + αγ)
δ2i · µ2 − β2 · γ2
(9)
When building NFG algorithm, a very important part is needed to analyze when the node chooses
a reciprocal cooperation strategy. It can be known from Equation (9) that Π of the node will be larger
than 0 only when certain conditions are met. That is, the reciprocal cooperative behavior of the node
needs to meet certain conditions. We prove it by Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. When δi of the node Ai is δi >
β·γ
µ , Π of the node Πi
∗ > 0, the node Ai will cooperate.
Proof. Known by Equation (9), when δi >
β·γ
µ ,there are:
β · δi · (µ + αγ) > 0, δ2i · µ2 − β2 · γ2 > 0,
∴ Πi∗ > 0; When δi <
β·γ
µ , there are: β · δi(µ + α · γ) > 0, where δ2i · µ2 − β2 · γ2 < 0,
∴ Πi∗ < 0; that is, when δi of the node Ai is δi >
β·γ
µ , Π of the node Πi
∗ > 0, the node Ai
will cooperate. 
From Theorem 1, it can be known that the reciprocal cooperation behavior of the node will only
occur when its level of reciprocal altruistic δi >
β·γ
µ . Since γ and µ are relatively stable constants,
the cooperative behavior of the node is mainly related to δi and β. Reasonably designing β based on δi,
the node’s cooperation behavior can be promoted.
B. The influence of δ on nodes’ utility
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It can be seen from Equations (3) and (5) that the utility Λi of the node is related to the reciprocal
altruistic δi of the node. When the nodes choose to cooperate, the reciprocal cooperation strategy
set ∆i
∗ at this time may contain multiple strategies and the node will select an optimal reciprocal
cooperation strategy s∗j to maximize its total utility Λi. We prove that Λi is related to δi of the node by
Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. Γi∗ and Πi∗ obtained by Equation (8) and (9) are the optimal economic utility and the optimal
cooperative willingness and Λi of the node is the largest at this time.
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= −µ < 0, ∴ According to the LaGrange multiplier method, it can be concluded that: Γi∗
and Πi∗ are the optimal economics utility and the optimal cooperative willingness and Λi of the node
is the largest at this time. 
Theorem 2 proves that the nodes with reciprocal altruistic attributes always have optimal Γi∗ and
optimal Πi∗ when they cooperate, which makes their Λi maximal. In the reciprocal altruistic-based
NFG proposed in this paper, the node needs to choose the appropriate optimal reciprocal cooperation
strategy to maximize its total utility. Therefore, we need to analyze the conditions under which the
node can obtain optimal Γi∗ and optimal Πi∗. We prove it by Theorem 3.




, node’s optimal Γi∗ and Πi∗ are the largest and utility Λi is largest at this time.


























Πi∗ = ∞, ∴ node’s optimal Γi∗ and Πi∗ are the largest and utility Λi is
largest at this time. 




, optimal Γi∗ of the node and optimal Πi∗
are the largest. In this way, we can get an inspiration that β should change with the change of δi of the
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node, in the case that the cooperation influence coefficient γ and µ are constant. The node can obtain
the optimal Γi∗ and the optimal Πi∗.
C. The influence of β on node’s cooperation behavior
It can be seen from the above analysis that when the level of altruistic property δi of the node is
certain, under the condition that δi >
β·γ
µ is satisfied (that is, under the condition that the node will
perform the reciprocal cooperation behavior), there is Πi∗ ∝ β, that is, the increment of β can promote
the node to choose the reciprocal cooperation behavior, which we prove by Theorem 4.
Theorem 4. When δi of the node Ai is constant, there is Πi∗ ∝ β. At this time, a single increase in β will
promote the reciprocal cooperation behavior of the node.






also ∵ (δ2i · µ2 − β2 · γ2)
2
> 0, 2β · δi(µ + α · γ) > 0,
∴ ∂Πi
∗
∂β > 0, that is: Πi
∗ ∝ β. 
At this time, a single increase in β will promote the reciprocal cooperation behavior of the node.
Theorem 4 further demonstrates that while δi of the node is included in the message cooperative
communication mechanism, β in the utility of the node also needs to be considered. Appropriate
increment of β can improve the node’s optimal Γi∗ and optimal Πi∗, thus promoting the reciprocal
cooperation behavior of the nodes. We calculate the value of β by Algorithm 1.
Based on Algorithm 1, we can calculate the appropriate value of β nodes that with different level
of reciprocal altruistic.
Algorithm 1: Computing_β
Initialize: The level of reciprocal altruistic: δ, reciprocal utility proportion coefficient: β, cooperating influence
coefficient: γ, Cost coefficient: µ
1: If δ ≤ β·γµ then
2: β← 0
3: Else
4: While δ > β·γµ do




4.2.2. Network Information Algorithm
Based on the above analysis of the reciprocal cooperation behavior of nodes, in the Behavior
Economics-based NFG Algorithm proposed in this paper, each node will select the appropriate node
to carry out the reciprocal cooperation behavior and construct the link from the source node to the
destination node. Once the network topology G is determined, the message transmission process
begins. The algorithm proposed in this paper is summarized as shown in Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 2: Reciprocal altruistic-based network formation algorithm
Inputs: current node: CA; neighbor nodes set: N; total nodes set: A; The set of CA′s reciprocal cooperation
strategy: SCA; CA′s reciprocal cooperation strategy: sCA = {CA, Ax}, sCA ∈ S, Ax ∈ A; CA′s utility:ΛCA
Output: network graph:G
Initialize state
Source node Ai wants to transmit packets to destination node Aj through a set of nodes A
Reciprocal altruistic-based network formation game
1: CA← Ai
2: G.add(Ai)
3: While N.getNode(Aj) == f alse do
4: if SCA /∈ ∅ then
5: if ΛCA(G + sCA) ≥ ΛCA (G), ∀sCA ∈ SCA then
6: G.add(Ax)
7: CA← Ax






Source node Ai transmits packets to destination node Aj through the formed link G
Each node in link G gain a utility Λ based on the utility function mentioned before
5. Performance Evaluation
The experimental part of this paper uses the Free Mobility Model proposed in Reference [49] to
construct a highway movement model scenario. In the experimental scenario, the expressway consists
of two lanes with a length of 2 km and a width of 10 m. The values of parameters such as number
of nodes, minimum speed and transmission range of nodes are diverse but for the fairness of the
experiment, we use the same values as the comparison paper used in its experiment. At the initial
moment, 23 vehicle nodes are randomly distributed at any position on the road, with a communication
range of 300 m and moving from left to right. The minimum moving speed of the vehicle node is
10 m/s and the maximum moving speed is 60 m/s. When the vehicle node reaches the leftmost
or rightmost end, the moving direction is changed, the experimental running time is 20 min and
all the experimental data are running 1000 times. Take the average to eliminate the effects of some
uncertainties. Specific experimental parameters are detailed in Table 3.
Table 3. Simulation parameters.
Parameters Value or Range
Number of lanes 2
Number of nodes 23
The length of lanes 2000 m
The width of lanes 10 m
Maximum node speed 60 m/s
Minimum node speed 10 m/s
Node’s transmission range 300 m
Cost coefficient µ 0.1, 0.15, 0.155, 0.160, 0.165, 0.170, 0.175, 0.2
Cooperating influence coefficient γ 0.1, 0.15, 0.155, 0.160, 0.165, 0.170, 0.175, 0.25
Reciprocal utility proportion coefficient β (0, 0.9)
reciprocal altruistic coefficient δ [0, 0], [0.1, 0.5], [0.1, 0.7], [0.1, 0.9], [0.3, 0.5], [0.3, 0.7],[0.3, 0.9], [0.5, 0.9], [0.7, 0.9]
Sensors 2018, 18, 3316 16 of 28
5.1. Cost Coefficient µ
Cost coefficient affects the final utility of the node, indicating the degree of cost paid by the node
due to cooperation. The smaller the value, the smaller the cost of cooperation among the nodes is. Since
the size of the cost coefficient directly affects the incentive of the node and the incentive received ratio
can reflect the proportion of participating nodes to a certain extent, this section discusses its influence
from two aspects: incentive received by nodes and incentive received ratio. Before we discuss the
value of µ in detail, let’s discuss the appropriate range of µ. As shown in Figure 3, when µ gradually
increases from 0.1 to 0.2, the incentive received by nodes decreases rapidly. When µ = 0.1, the incentive
received by nodes reaches about 1700 and when µ = 0.2, the incentive received by nodes is close to
0, incentive received by nodes becomes too large or too small will reduce the enthusiasm of node
participation, thus we mainly discuss the situation when µ takes 0.155~0.175.
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5.1.1. The Impact of   on Incentive Received by Nodes 
When   changes, the figure of the incentive received by nodes changes as shown in Figure 4. 
As can be seen from Figure 4. As the running time increases, the incentive obtained by the node also 
increases. When   increasing from 0.155 to 0.175, the incentive finally obtained by the node 
decreases with the increment of  , because when   increases, the cost of cooperation of the node 
increases correspondingly, so that the ultimate incentive of the node is reduced. It also can be seen 
from Figure 3. When  =0.175, the final utility of the node will be too large; when  =0.155, the final 
utility of the node will be too small, so   should be between 0.155 and 0.175. The specific value of
  is analyzed by the influence of   on the received receive ratio of the node in the next section. 
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5.1.1. The Impact of µ on Incentive Received by Nodes
When µ changes, the figure of the incentive received by nodes changes as shown in Figure 4.
As can be seen from Figure 4. As the running time increases, the incentive obtained by the node also
increases. When µ increasing from 0.155 to 0.175, the incentive finally obtained by the node decrea es
with the increment of µ, because when µ increases, the cost of cooperation of th node increas s
corr spondingly, so that the ultimate in entive of the node is reduced. It als can b seen fr m Figure 3.
When µ = 0.175, the final utility of the node will be too large; when µ = 0.155, the final utility of the
node will be too small, so µ should be between 0.155 and 0.175. The specific value of µ is analyzed by
the influence of µ on the received receive ratio of the node in the next section.
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5.1.2. The Impact of   on Incentive Received Ratio 
Figure 5 shows the relationship of the received ratio over time as the  changes. Incentive 
received ratio refers to the proportion of nodes that receive incentives in all nodes. Since the nodes 
only get the incentive after the cooperative behavior occurs, the incentive received ratio can reflect 
the proportion of node cooperation to a certain extent. As can be seen from Figure 5, as the simulation 
time increases, the incentive received ratio also increases and finally reaches 1, that is, all nodes 
participate in the cooperative transmission of the message. At the same time, it can be seen from 
Figure 5. At the 13th min, when  =0.165, the value of the incentive received ratio reaches 1 first, so 
in the subsequent experiments in this paper, 0.165 is taken. 
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Figure 4. The impact of µ on incentive received by nodes.
5.1.2. The Impact of µ on Incentive Received Ratio
Figure 5 shows the relationship of the received ratio over time as the µ changes. Incentive received
ratio refers to the proportion of n des that rec iv incentives in all nodes. Since the nodes only get the
incentive after the cooperative behavior occurs, the incentive received ratio can reflect the proportion
of node cooperation to a certain extent. As can be seen from Figure 5, as the simulation time increases,
the incentive received ratio also increases and finally reaches 1, that is, all nodes participate in the
cooperative transmission of the message. At the same time, it can be seen from Figure 5. At the 13th
min, when µ = 0.165, the value of the incentive received ratio reaches 1 first, so in the subsequent
experiments in this paper, 0.165 is taken.
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Before we discuss the value of γ i de ail, l t’s discuss the appropriate range of γ. As shown in
Figure 6, when gradually increases from 0.1 to 0.25, the incentive received by nodes decreases rapidly.
When γ = 0.1, the incentive received by nodes reaches about 600 and when γ = 0.25, the incentive
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received by nodes is less than 100, incentive received by nodes becomes too large or too small will
reduce the enthusiasm of node participation, thus we mainly discuss the situation when γ takes
0.155~0.175.
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is because when   increases, the greater the impact of cooperative behavior on  , the resulting 
reciprocal cooperation costs will increase accordingly, making the ultimate node’s incentive reduced. 
Compared with Figure 4, as   increases, the final incentive change of the node is less. This is 
because   only effects   of the node and the resulting reciprocal cooperation cost is less than the 
total cost of cooperation, so the degree of change is relatively small compared to Figure 4 We 
determine the range of values of   is [0.165, 0.175] by Figure 6. The specific values of   are 
discussed in the next section. 
Figure 6. The impact of γ’s range on incentive received by nodes.
5.2. Reciprocal Altruistic Cooperation Influence Coefficient γ
Cooperating influence coefficient γ is a coefficient that indicates the degree of influence of
reciprocal cooperation among nodes on its Φ. Th larger the value, the greater the influenc of the
reciprocal cooperation behavior among nodes. This section also analyzes the reasonable values from
the two aspects: incentive received by nodes and incentive received ratio.
5.2.1. The Impact of γ on Incentive Received by Nodes
Figure 7 shows the relatio ship between the incentive received by nodes and the time when γ
changes. As shown in Figure 7, when γ increases, the final incentive value of the node decreases.
This is because when γ increases, the greater the impact of cooperative behavior on Φ, the resulting
reciprocal cooperation costs will increase accordingly, making the ultimate node’s incentive reduced.
Compared with Figure 4, as γ increases, the final incentive change of the node is less. This is because γ
only effects Φ of the ode and the resulting reciprocal cooperation cost is less tha the total cost of
cooperation, so the degree of change is relatively sm ll compar d to Figure 4 We det rmine the range
of valu s of γ is [0.165, 0.175] by Figure 6. The specific valu s of γ re discussed in the next section.
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5.2.2. The Impact of   on Incentive Received Ratio 
Figure 8 shows the relationship of the incentive received ratio over time as  changes. As can be 
seen from Figure 8, the incentive received ratio increases with time and finally reaches 1, that is, all 
nodes participate in cooperative message transmission. At the 11min, when   = 0.165, the value of 
its incentive received ratio reaches 1 first, so in the subsequent experiments in this paper,   takes 
0.165. 





























Figure 8. The impact of   on incentive received ratio ( =0.165, [0.1,0.9], (0,0.9)    ). 
5.3. Reciprocal Utility Proportion Coefficient   
  is a coefficient indicating the proportion of the node’s   in the total utility of the node. The 
larger the value is, the greater the proportion of the node’s   in its total utility is. We designed 
experiments based on Theorems 1 and 4 and explored reasonable values. 
Figure 7. The impact of γ on incentive received by nodes.
5.2.2. The Impact of γ on Incentive Received Ratio
Figure 8 shows the relationship of the incentive received ratio over time as γ changes. As can
be seen from Figure 8, the incentive received ratio increases with time and finally reaches 1, that is,
all nodes participat in cooperative message transmission. At the 11min, when γ = 0.165, the value of
its incentive received ratio reaches 1 first, so in the subsequent experiments in this paper, γ takes 0.165.
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5.3. Reciprocal Utility Proportion Coefficient   
  is a coefficient indicating the proportion of the node’s   in the total utility of the node. The 
larger the value is, the greater the proportion of the node’s   in its total utility is. We designed 
experiments based on Theorems 1 and 4 and explored reasonable values. 
Figure 8. The impact of γ on incentive received ratio (µ = 0.165, δ ∈ [0.1, 0.9], β ∈ (0, 0.9)).
5.3. Reciprocal Utility Proportion Coefficient β
β is a coefficient indicating the proportion of the node’s Φ in the total utility of the node. The larger
the value is, the greater the proportion of the node’s Φ in its total utility is. We designed experiments
bas d on Theorems 1 and 4 and explored reasonable valu s.
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As shown in Figure 9, the Z-axis represents the incentive received by nodes after running
for 20 min. The X-axis represents the reciprocal altruistic coefficient δ of the node and the Y-axis
represents β. Figure 9 shows the relationship between the incentive received by nodes and β. As can
be seen from the figure, when δ = 0.9 and β→ 0.9 , the total utility of the node is the largest, the same
can be seen that, when δ = 0.5 or 0.7, β→ 0.5 or β→ 0.7 , the total utility of the node is the largest. So,
in the experiments that follow, we assume that β = δ− 0.01.
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5.4. BMCGM Compared with NGOMA
This section compares BMCGM with the traditional message cooperative communication
mechanis NGOMA and analyzes the performance of BMCGM from four aspects: incentive received
by nodes, incentive received ratio, delay ratio and transmitted packet ratio.
5.4.1. Incentive Received by Nodes with Respect to Time
Figure 10 compares the difference between the BMCGM and NGOMA in the aspect of incentive
received by nodes. As can be seen from Figure 10, as the experimental running time increases, incentive
received by nodes increase in BMCGM and NGOMA with the nodes participate in cooperation.
While node’s incentive in BMCGM is greater than the node’s incentive in NGOMA, this is because
in NGOMA, only the influence of Γ on the choice of node behavior is considered and the node only
cooperates in the case of maximizing its own Γ. In the BMCGM, the reciprocal altruistic of the node is
considered. Compared to the traditional message cooperation transmission mechanism, nodes are more
likely to achieve cooperative behavior, so nodes in BMCGM received mor incentive than NGOMA.
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5.4.2. Incentive Received Ratio with Respect to Time 
Figure 11 compares the difference between the BMCGM and NGOMA in the aspect of incentive 
received ratio. It can be seen from Figure 9 that incentive received ratios of the two algorithms 
increase with time and the growth in the early part of the experiment is faster and the latter part 
increases slowly and finally reaches 1. This is because, assume that there are n  nodes in the network, 
the nodes randomly send messages to each other and the message is sent from the source node to the 
destination node through one or more relay nodes. Suppose that there are a  nodes participate in 
the message cooperative transmission after the i th random interaction, then the proportion of nodes 
that have not obtained incentive after the interaction is ( )n a n− . When the ( 1i + )th interaction 
starts, it is obvious that if the value of a  is larger, the proportion of nodes that have not participated 
in the cooperation before is smaller, so the growth in the early part of the experiment is faster and the 
latter part increases slowly. At the same time, it can be seen from Figure 11, BMCGM’s incentive 
received ratio grows faster than the NGOMA and reaches 1 in 11 min. This is because, in the case of 
considering the reciprocal altruistic of nodes, the node is more willing to cooperate. 
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5.4.2. Incentive Received Ratio with Respect to Time
Figure 11 compares the difference between the BMCGM and NGOMA in the aspect of incentive
received ratio. It can be seen from Figure 9 that incentive received ratios of the two algorithms increase
with time and the growth in the early part of the experiment is faster and the latter part increases
slowly and finally reaches 1. This is because, assume that there are n nodes in the network, the nodes
randomly send messages to each other and the message is sent from the source node to the destination
node through one or more relay nodes. Suppose that there are a nodes participate in the message
cooperative transmission after the ith random interaction, then the proportion of nodes that have not
obtained incentive after the interaction is (n− a)/n. When the (i + 1)th interaction starts, it is obvious
that if the value of a is larger, the proportion of nodes that have not participated in the cooperation
before is smaller, so the growth in the early part of the experiment is faster and the latter part increases
slowly. At the same time, it can be seen from Figure 11, BMCGM’s incentive received ratio grows faster
than the NGOMA and reaches 1 in 11 min. This is because, in the case of considering the reciprocal
altruistic of nodes, the node is more willing to cooperate.
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5.4.3. Delay Ratio with Respect to Time
Delay refers to the time taken for the message to be sent from the source node to the destination
node. The delay ratio in this section refers to the ratio of delay to the current running time. Figure 12
comparing the performance difference between BMCGM and NGOMA in delay ratio. As can be
seen from the figure, both the BMCGM and NGOMA delay ratio increase with time but the BMCGM
delay ratio is smaller than the NGOMA delay ratio, this is because in BMCGM, Π of nodes with
altruistic reciprocal attributes is higher than the self-interested nodes assumed in the traditional
message cooperative transmission mechanism. In NGOMA, when the source node and the node
around the destination node cannot maximize their own incentive by cooperating transmit messages,
they will not choose cooperation. In BMCGM, the node with the altruistic reciprocal attribute will be
affected by Φ and the cooperation behavior will be selected. The cooperative behavior that cannot be
achieved in NGOMA can be reached in BMCGM, thus reduces the delay ratio, so BMCGM has a lower
delay ratio than NGOMA.
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5.4.4. Transmitted Packet Ratio with Respect to Time 
The transmitted packet count refers to the number of messages sent between the source node 
and the destination node. Therefore, when the number of messages between the source node and the 
destination node increases, the transmitted packet count increases accordingly. Figure 13 compares 
the performance difference between BMCGM and NGOMA in the aspect of transmitted packet ratio. 
It can be seen from the figure that the transmitted packet ratio of BMCGM and NGOMA increases 
with time and compared with NGOMA, BMCGM has lower transmitted packet ratio, that is because 
in NGOMA, when the source node needs to send a message to the destination node through one or 
more relay nodes, if these nodes cannot maximize their own aggregation through cooperative 
message transmission, these nodes will not cooperate, at this time, the source node needs to wait for 
the message to be directly transmitted to the destination node. when the cause such as channel 
congestion occurs, the destination node cannot receive the message or the source node cannot receive 
the acknowledge message of the destination node and the source node attempts to retransmit the 
message to the destination node, the transmitted packet count will increase and the transmitted 
packet ratio will increase. In BMCGM, the node is more willing to cooperate because of the reciprocal 
altruistic of the node, so the transmitted packet ratio is lower. 
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5.4.4. Transmitted Packet Ratio with Respect to Time
The transmitted packet count refers to the number of messages sent between the source node
and the destination node. Therefore, when the number of messages between the source node and the
destination node increases, the transmitted packet count increases accordingly. Figure 13 compares
the performance difference between BMCGM and NGOMA in the aspect of transmitted packet ratio.
It can be seen from the figure that the transmitted packet ratio of BMCGM and NGOMA increases
with time and compared with NGOMA, BMCGM has lower transmitted packet ratio, that is because
in NGOMA, when the source node needs to send a message to the destination node through one
or more relay nodes, if these nodes cannot maximize their own aggregation through cooperative
message transmission, these nodes will not cooperate, at this time, the source node needs to wait
for the message to be directly transmitted to the destination node. when the cause such as channel
congestion occurs, the destination node cannot receive the message or the source node cannot receive
the acknowledge message of the destination node and the source node attempts to retransmit the
message to the destination node, the transmitted packet count will increase and the transmitted packet
ratio will increase. In BMCGM, the node is more willing to cooperate because of the reciprocal altruistic
of the node, so the transmitted packet ratio is lower.
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5.5. The Impact of   on BMCGM 
This section analyzes the effects of reciprocal altruistic coefficient   on BMCGM from four 
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20 min of experimental operation. It can be seen from the figure that when   is gradually increasing 
from [0.1, 0.5] to [0.1, 0.9], or gradually increasing from [0.3, 0.5] to [0.3, 0.9] and gradually increasing 
from [0.5, 0.9] to [0.7, 0.9], the total utility of the node is increasing. This result shows that when the 
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5.5. The Impact of δ on BMCGM
This section analyzes the effects of reciprocal altruistic coefficient δ on BMCGM from four
aspects: incentive received by nodes, average incentive received ratio, average delay ratio and average
transmitted packet ratio.
Figure 14 Shows the effect of different value intervals of δ on the total utility of the nodes after
20 min of experimental operation. It can be seen from the figure that when δ is gradually increasing
fro [0.1, 0.5] to [0.1, 0.9], or gradually increasing from [0.3, 0.5] to [0.3, 0.9] and gra ally i creasi g
fro [0.5, 0.9] to [0.7, 0.9], the total utility of the node is increasing. This result shows that when
the average reciprocal altruistic property of the no e increases, the final utility of the node will also
increase. At the same time, it can be seen from the figure that when the average level of reciprocal
altruistic is the same, that is, when the node’s reciprocal altruistic attribute value interval is [0.1, 0.7] or
[0.3, 0.5], the final utility of the node is similar.
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Table 4 shows the influence of the reciprocal altruistic   in 3 aspects: the average incentive 
received ratio, the average delay ratio and the average transmitted packet ratio. When    [0.0, 0.0], 
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Table 4 shows the influence of the reciprocal altruistic δ in 3 aspects: the average incentive received
ratio, the average delay ratio and the average transmitted packet ratio. When δ ∈ [0.0, 0.0], it means that
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the reciprocal altruistic attribute of the node is not considered at this time, that is, traditional message
cooperation transmission mechanism. It can be seen from the table that the value range of δ gradually
increases from [0.1, 0.5] to [0.1, 0.9], or from [0.3, 0.5] to [0.3, 0.9] and from [0.5, 0.7] to [0.7, 0.9], BMCGM’s
average incentive received ratio gradually increases, while the average delay ratio and average
transmitted packet ratio are gradually reduced. It fully demonstrates that the increment of δ can promote
the cooperative behavior between nodes and improve the cooperation rate of nodes, while reducing
the delay of message cooperation transmission and average transmitted packet ratio. Compared with
the traditional message cooperation transmission mechanism. It means δ ∈ [0.0, 0.0], even when the
average level of reciprocal altruistic of the node is low (δ ∈ [0.1, 0.5], δ = 0.4), the performance of
BMCGM is still better than the traditional message cooperation communication mechanism.
Table 4. The impact of δ on the performance of BMCGM.
[δmin, δmax]
Average Incentive
Received Ratio Average Delay Ratio
Average Transmitted
Packet Ratio
[0, 0] 0.822500 0.236230 0.500978
[0.1, 0.5] 0.930196 0.176718 0.433636
[0.1, 0.7] 0.930783 0.171194 0.431537
[0.1, 0.9] 0.930816 0.165311 0.430759
[0.3, 0.5] 0.930483 0.171045 0.431161
[0.3, 0.7] 0.930535 0.165386 0.431021
[0.3, 0.9] 0.930811 0.157926 0.429031
[0.5, 0.7] 0.931072 0.157916 0.425436
[0.5, 0.9] 0.931841 0.146634 0.357593
[0.7, 0.9] 0.932115 0.135721 0.356618
6. Conclusions
In this paper, based on the inspiration of behavioral economics, we use reciprocal altruistic in
the cooperation transmission mechanism and construct a new message transmission cooperation
guarantee mechanism named BMCGM. We construct a cooperative willingness function based on
reciprocal altruistic which can reflect the friendly of other nodes. We design a reciprocal utility function
based on cooperative willingness function, where the utility of a node is determined by the combination
of economical utility and reciprocal utility. In BMCGM, the nodes’ behavior is analyzed based on
reciprocal altruistic and nodes’ cooperation behavior are promoted. Simulation results show that
BMCGM reduces message transmission delay by at least 30.3% and transmitted packet ratio by at least
10% compared with the recent representative cooperation transmission mechanism NGOMA.
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